Largely through the advent of contemporary historicity, the concept of paradigm shifts or revolutionary change in science has received much attention as a model to understand the philosophy of science. Since the publication of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the word paradigm has become almost common place in the English language. Not unlike other words of frequent use, paradigm has taken on a variety of nuanced definitions—ranging from the relatively simple, referring to a pattern or example to the 21 different uses of the term found in Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and identified by Margaret Masterman.
In his paper, Paradigms and the Nature of Change in American Archaeology, David J. Meltzer, in spite of its vagaries, builds off of the paradigm model developed by Kuhn. He argues that there has been no paradigm shift in archeology; there has been no revolution because the metaphysic of archaeology remains unchanged from the culture history period to the present. In view of their changed methodologies, most archaeologist's are still trying to reconstruct human behavior from the fossil record; only their methods differ, not their metaphysical grounds. Jay F. Custer refutes Meltzer's conclusions and himself claims that the transition from particularistic to nomothetic research itself constitutes a paradigm shift and “represents a major metaphysical reorientation.” He recommends that one look at a discipline's goals to find paradigm change. Meltzer responds that Custer misunderstands him, and reiterates that methodological change is a poor measure of paradigm shifts. Goals are a bad indicator of paradigm shifts because “goals are like the weather: everyone likes to talk about them. In part, this was one of the crucial problems with the New Archaeology; it was a rhetorical revolution” largely constructed by new archaeologists wishing to break from the culture history agenda. Meltzer, in turn, rejects Custer's advice and reaffirms his metaphysical argument. He finds that the world-view changing introduction of a new metaphysic, the power of a paradigm shift, is not present in archaeology. What is revealed in the exchange between Meltzer and Custer is a fundamental misunderstanding centered on the concept paradigm. Central to any definition of the term will be an understanding of its malleable and and yet amorphous character.
If the object of research and discovery is to reveal the truth of nature then a paradigm shift would entail a realization so dramatic that most or all of the old rules will no longer apply. Any measure for a candidate revolution will be one of dramatic magnitude. How drastic are the revisions necessary? If the alterations are slight, then we can safely call this normal science but if a program of complete restructuring is necessary to accommodate them, then a paradigm shift has occurred. Some examples are so obvious that they inherently refute criticism, such as Charles Lyell's concept of uniformitarianism, Newton's laws of motion, and Einstein's relativistic physics. Almost intuitively, given that one is aware of the prevailing views immediately before these revelatory ideas were unveiled, there is no doubt that these were paradigm shifts. In each case there is a distinct and irrefutable before and an undeniable after. In Lyell's case, geologic formations meant something new, that is to say that they were and still are interpreted within the context of his ideas. Newton changed the way that motion is understood and Einstein's ideas changed that again. Each created a new, and what they considered more accurate context within which to view reality. Time and the presence of their ideas in our modern pantheon is a testament to their enduring influence.
Awareness of dramatic magnitude is essential before concluding that a paradigm shift has occurred. Such a revolution in thought entails to the thinker that the meaning of the world has changed. One is now able to think what formerly could not be thought. If we are to understand the character of a paradigm and subsequently delineate a paradigm shift, then it is not permissible to overlook the relativistic nature of language. In Protagoras' words: "Man is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not." Falling between “are” and “are not” is also implied every subjective shade of gray. Paradigms, and by extension, paradigm shifts are not wrought iron constructions. They are artificial creations that have individual meaning and not a single unitary definition. There is no absolute dictionary to refer to. This is the primary hindrance to any universally agreeable formalization of “paradigm” and the cause of the substantial confusion found in all attempts to create one. Recognition of a paradigm shift occurring in the past is entirely based on the lasting reputation of that event. Its dramatic magnitude and ensuing consequences are only recognizable in retrospect. The rubric for this recognition is human reaction. This is also the essential barrier encountered when evaluating the impact of recent history. The ramifications of any new theoretical framework may be simply the latest addition to a number of competing viewpoints or it prove to outstrip them. Its impact, for reasons maintained above, cannot be effectively evaluated by those contemporary to it. Neither can it be reduced to a formula capable of discerning current or recent paradigmatic revolutions. Changes in world-view occur or do not irrespective of arguments for or against them.
While Meltzer discontinues his pursuit of historical proximity as a line of investigation into the varied conclusions that a paradigm shift has taken place in archaeology, it is the most compelling of his positions. His conclusion that historical proximity is too difficult to test reveals its influence on the entire enterprise of searching out paradigms. The close association of the assessors to their object precludes any attempt at appraising it. There is no doubt that many significant features distinguish the new archaeology of the 1960s and 1970s from the earlier culture history period and that many have interpreted them as revolutionary distinctions. The period in archaeology termed “postprocessual” is difficult to speak of in a unified sense without resorting definitions of what it is not: namely, the new archaeology of the 1960s and 1970s. Under this banner is included such diverse disciplines as hermeneutics, critical-theory, Marxism, and neo-Marxism. Many of these innovative approaches originate no more than 5 or 10 years ago. It is too soon to know what legacy will develop from them. It is arguable that the existence of such a large number of upheavals in a, compared to other disciplines, relatively short period adds substance to the premise that archaeology has never had a period of normal science. When we speak of the revolutionary change in the wakes of ideas such as uniformitarianism and Newtonian physics, we speak of the disruption of paradigms that are centuries if not millennia in age. Archaeology, as a science, has never felt the cohesion of any general, overarching theories which might be supplanted and thereby allow for the possibility of a paradigm shift.
1979 Paradigms and the Nature of Change in American Archaeology. American Antiquity 44:644-657.
1981 Paradigms Lost, Paradigms Found. American Antiquity 46:662-665.
Custer, Jay F.
1981 Comments on David Meltzer’s Paradigms and the Nature of Change in American Archaeology. American Antiquity 46:660-661.
Kuhn, Thomas S.
2002 The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993 University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Waterfield, Robin
2000 The First Philosophers. Oxford University Press, New York.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
1999 Tractatus Logico-Philosiphicus. Dover Publications, Mineola.
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